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Pain, as a physical and emotional experience, is an involuntary and unpleasant 
response to a situation, namely an external manifestation of an unintentional 
aversion to reality. This paper discusses the social aspects of pain that are 
relevant to political philosophy, insofar as the concept of pain can be considered 
as an effective parameter to define a society. It will be argued that if pain in our 
society is experienced as private, the experience of solidarity can only be shared 
with people and situations with whom we can identify.  In order to understand 
the emotional distance of many injustices in the world, the need for an awareness 
of human beings’ involvement in other people’s suffering is critical.  
Introduction 
According to the IASP (International Association for the Study of Pain), pain 
is «an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual 
and potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage»1. 
However, to speak about pain does not only mean to speak about a 
disagreeable (physical and emotional) experience. To speak about pain 
mainly means speaking about a great contradiction that can be approached 
in different ways, starting from the different stances that philosophers have 
taken towards pain.  
In the philosophical debate, pain is defined in a variety of ways and from 
opposing perspectives. In certain areas (such as philosophy of mind, and 
certain fields of phenomenology and psychology) only the universal structure 
of pain and/or its character of individuality are underlined; in other areas 
(such as biopolitics and political philosophy) the focus of the analysis is on the 
social character of pain. 
                                                        
1 Definition of “pain” provided by the International Association for the Study of Pain, 
available at: http://www.iasp-pain.org/Education/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1698 [Last 
accessed on 2018 June 12]. 
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On the one hand pain is indeed a personal experience, so that, as Ulrich 
Kohlmann has said, «every suffering suffers differently. And not everybody 
suffers»2. When experienced, pain is immediately felt in its singularity, and 
it is impossible for the subject to completely communicate the singular 
character of their experience. 
On the other hand, pain has a public-social dimension. This is not only 
because the majority of pain is caused by our society, but also because pain 
as such, as an emotional and physical experience, is always socially mediated, 
so that the conception of pain can be considered as a parameter that defines 
a society. The way in which people respond to what they consider as painful 
is not only different in each society, but has also changed in every society over 
time. In Johanna Bourke’s words, people-in-pain’s responses to afflictions are 
normative: «People-in pain seek to conform to these instructions for numerous 
reasons, including non-reflexive ones (this may be especially true of those 
figurative ways of speaking about pain that have been internalized from 
infancy or are deeply embedded in language)»3. 
Theodor Adorno investigates pain in its twofold nature, through the 
dialectic between the private and social dimensions. These dimensions are 
both crucial to understanding pain: they are at the same time not completely 
separable and not completely solvable in one dimension. Pain has a private 
side that is often perceived as being isolated, but that should always be 
understood in a social context that mediates this feeling. The duty of a 
political philosophy is to reflect on the senselessness of pain in our society, to 
focus on the suffering, not only in order to describe it, but above all to find its 
truth. As Adorno puts it: «The need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition 
of all truth»4. This truth lies both in the presence of suffering, that is, in its 
public dimension, [as Benjamin says, because «as long as there is still one 
                                                        
2 U. Kohlmann, Dialektik der Moral. Untersuchungen zur Moralphilosophie Adornos, zu 
Klampen, Lüneburg 1997, p. 143. My translation from German: «Jeder Leidende leidet 
anders. Und nicht alle leiden». 
3 J. Bourke, Story of pain. From prayer to painkillers, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, 
p. 17. 
4 Ibidem. 
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beggar around, there will still be myth»5], and also in the way that we feel 
suffering/pain, in its private dimension. 
My article will analyse this duty by discussing, with and beyond Adorno, 
(1) what is the pain on which we must reflect, and (2) how could it be 
expressed, or in other words, in what way could we allow the pain to become 
eloquent. In part (2) I will focus my attention on the role of artistic images as 
expressions of pain and criticize an idea of empathic emotion as feeling for 
the pain of others. 
1. What is pain: The contradictions of its senselessness 
With Adorno we can speak of two major contradictions of pain, in its collective 
and private dimension. These contradictions are, according to Adorno, not 
only anthropological or natural, but also historical. 
The first of these contradictions is the existence of senseless pain. 
Unnecessary pain negates, by its very existence, an idea of historical and 
rational progress: despite technological progress and social improvements, 
people continue to suffer. Thus Adorno writes: «The physical moment tells our 
knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that things should be different»6. 
Adorno interprets history as catastrophe and suffering, and inverts Hegel’s 
view that history as second nature means progress and freedom: «His world 
spirit is the ideology of natural history»7. He takes as a model Walter 
Benjamin's idea of natural history, according to which nature is the forgotten 
of history that, in an allegorical view (contrary to a symbolic view), is the pain 
that is not transfigured: «Everything about history that, from the very 
beginning, has been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed as a face 
– or rather in a death’s head»8. 
The second contradiction is in the way we feel pain. History produced 
suffering and at the same time let this suffering forget. Adorno wants to break 
                                                        
5 W. Benjamin, The Arcades Project (1982), translated by H. Eiland, K. McLaughlin, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1999, K 6, 4, p. 400. 
6 T. W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (1966), translated by E. B. Ashton, Routledge, London-
New York 2004, p. 203. 
7 Ivi, p. 356. 
8 W. Benjamin, The origin of German tragic drama (1925), translated by J. Onsborne, Verso, 
London-New York 1998, p. 166. 
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with a view of history as the defense of development, and, like Walter 
Benjamin’s Engel, «awake the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed»9. In the Dialectics of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer draw 
a parallel between the situation of patients under anesthetic as described in 
a nineteenth century letter, and our relationship with pain. They mention a 
letter of the French physiologist Flourens about the use of chloroform in 
surgery, in which it is claimed that «in conjunction with a general paralysis 
of innervation, pain is felt still more keenly than in the normal state» but «the 
deception of the public results [only] from the inability of the patient to 
remember the events once the operation is completed»10. In response to this, 
Adorno and Horkheimer write: «A suspicion would arise that our attitude 
toward human beings, and toward all creatures, is no different to that toward 
ourselves after a successful operation: blindness to torment»11. 
This blindness shows, on the one hand, the selective-cultural character of 
pain. In Judith Butler's words, in a text after September 11th, not all people 
are worthy of grief: «Some lives are grievable, and others are not; the 
differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and 
must be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and 
maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human: 
what counts as a livable life and a grievable death?»12. 
On the other hand, the blindness to pain shows the impossibility of 
reflecting on all unintentional bodily feelings of inadequacy, annoyance, 
helplessness, and aversion to situations or aspects of reality that we can have. 
This kind of suffering is, according to Adorno, who refers to psychoanalysis, 
the trace of the repression or transformation by the (socially conditioned) 
                                                        
9 W. Benjamin, On the concept of History (1940), in W. Benjamin, Selected writings, Volume 
4 (1938-1940), translated by E. Jephcott and others, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(MA) 2006, p. 392: «There is a picture by Klee called Angelus Novus. […] The angel would 
like to stay, awake the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing 
from Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong that the angel can no longer 
close them. This storm drives him irresistibly into the tut  to which his back is turned, while 
the pile of debris before him grows ward the sky. What we call progress is this storm». 
10 T. W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightment. Philosophical fragments (1944), translated by E. 
Jephcott, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2002, pp. 190-191. 
11 Ibidem. 
12 J. Butler, Precarious Life. The power of Mourning and Violence, Verso, London-New York 
2004, pp. XIV-XV. 
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consciousness, the trace of something that we are not able to really feel, 
namely to understand and to autonomously elaborate. 
These moments are to be reflected upon and understood in terms of their 
potential for truth: «Instead of curing neurosis [like Freud], he [Kafka, but we 
can also say: the same Adorno] seeks in it itself the healing force, that of 
knowledge: the wounds with which society brands the individual are seen by 
the latter as ciphers of social untruth, as the negative of truth. His power is 
one of demolition»13. 
That is, our society produces unnecessary pain: we are unable to accept all 
the pain that is produced within our universal idea of pain, and to understand 
the feelings that negate our harmony with reality. For these reasons the most 
important duty is to let pain become eloquent, to lend a voice to suffering. 
2. How to lend a voice to suffering 
Those who say that pain is not sufficiently considered in our society fail to 
offer a political analysis of society. Thanks in particular to the internet and 
social networks, we are continuously bombarded not only with news, but also 
with photos, videos, and movies about wars, natural disasters, poverty, death, 
rapes, executions. Suffering is the order of the day. Not only do we become 
used to living directly in a state of vulnerability, to accepting a dimension of 
potential danger and pain, but we also become accustomed to being close to 
suffering. 
Currently the images transmitted via television, the internet or newsprint 
are the most common means to show pain. Images are more immediate than 
all other forms of representation, and they are directly accessible by everyone. 
But images of pain as such do not let pain become eloquent. With her 
analysis of war photographs in her book Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan 
Sontag focuses on the issues concerning images that aim to be mere copies of 
reality. Not only do such war photographs appear to depict reality objectively, 
but they always show a perspective that can manipulate reality more than a 
                                                        
13 T. W. Adorno, Notes on Kafka (1953), in T.W. Adorno, Prisms, translated by S. Weber, S. 
Weber, MIT Press, London 1997, p. 251. 
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report because of their illusion of immediacy. In general, such images make 
people feel closer to the pain of others, and arouse an emotional identification 
with painful situations: they give the emotional illusion of being close to 
suffering, but in fact they leave us distant from an understanding of pain and 
its context, and thus they allow us to accept suffering. In Sontag’s words: «So 
far as we feel sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what caused the 
suffering. Our sympathy proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence. 
To that extent, it can be (for all our good intentions) an impertinent—if not 
an inappropriate—response»14. As Benjamin argues, that is a point of view 
that means an empathy with the victors15. To immediately identify oneself 
with suffering is always to identify oneself with determined, acknowledged 
suffering, and, indirectly, to accept its existence. 
It could be interesting, without addressing the controversy between 
Adorno and Benjamin about pictures of cultural industry (and Adorno's 
scepticism about them), to briefly recall Adorno's definition of the artistic 
image in order to reflect on the duty of images in our society. In Aesthetic 
Theory Adorno defines the artistic image as apparition, and distinguishes it 
from a copy: «Artworks are images as apparition, as appearance, and not as 
a copy […] If, as images, artworks are the persistence of the transient, they 
are concentrated in appearance as something momentary»16. The image as 
apparition shows a truth that is not an immediate imitation of reality as such. 
Instead, it recalls something that is particular and fleeting, and that is shown 
in its distance. It is momentary, because it does not allow itself to be grasped. 
Its distance is, according to Adorno, not another dimension to immanence, 
but an alterity within the immanence that is not immediately to be seen and 
that does not lend itself to be represented in an immediate way. 
An image is artistic if it can combine the moment of mediation, the 
technique, with the mimetic moment, with the capacity of non-conceptual 
                                                        
14 S. Sontag, Regarding the pain of others, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 2003, p. 102. 
15 W. Benjamin, On the concept of History, cit., p. 391: «The nature of this sadness becomes 
clearer if we ask: With whom does historicism actually sympathize? The answer is inevitable: 
with the victor. And all rulers are the heirs of prior conquerors. Hence, empathizing with the 
victor invariably benefits the current rulers». 
16 T. W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (1970), translated by R. Hullot-Kentor, Regents of the 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 1997, pp. 83-84. 
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affinity with fragments of living reality that is that of pain: «Artistic 
expression comports itself mimetically, just as the expression of living 
creatures is that of pain»17. Dissonance becomes the material and the form of 
art: historical moments of tension and contradiction are combined in 
dissonant configurations that do not transfigure them, but try to express their 
unexpressed and unexperienced aspects: «Every dissonance is in a certain 
sense a part of the remembrance of the suffering that the domination of 
nature [Naturbeherrschung], and ultimately a dominating society, inflicts on 
nature»18. 
An experience of dissonance is a shocking experience of affinity with what 
is negated by society, and implies an impulse to feel human and non-human 
suffering without involving an immediate empathic emotion as such. Through 
empathy, according to Aristotle’s classical definition19, a person is able to feel 
the pain of a sufferer only if they are close to her, so that this emotion has a 
selective and self-referential character, in contrast to its supposed universal 
character. This moment of affinity with the sufferer goes beyond a mere 
identification with the pain of others: «Once man, the subject, knows the 
moment of his own equality with nature, he will desist from merely equalizing 
nature with himself»20. 
Such feeling attempts to gain direct access to forgotten (and painful) 
contradictions of reality, not in order to remain an immediate feeling, but to 
provide the possibility of reflecting on it. Thus, philosophy and its conceptual 
system are not redundant. It is only the encounter of images and thought that 
allows the critique of reality, namely the eloquence of pain. 
                                                        
17 Ivi, p. 110. 
18 T. W. Adorno, Ästhetik, Wintersemsester 1958-1959, ed. by O. Eberhard, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main 2009, p. 66. My translation from German: «Jede Dissonanz ist 
gewissermaßen ein Stück Eingedanken des Leidens, dem die Naturbeherrschung, dem 
überhaupt schließlich eine herrschaftliche Gesellschaft die Natur aussetzt [...]». 
19 Aristotle’s well-known definition of pity says «Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain 
caused by the sight of some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not 
deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover 
to befall us soon» [Aristotle, Rhetoric (II 1385b13ff), translated by W. R. Roberts, Modern 
Library, New York 1954, p. 113]. 
20 T. W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, cit., p. 269. 
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Such images need to be mediated by thought because their truth needs to 
be fixed and articulated to become critical: «Each work, if it is to be 
experienced, requires thought, however rudimentary it may be, and because 
this thought does not permit itself to be checked, each work ultimately 
requires philosophy as the thinking comportment that does not stop short in 
obedience to the prescriptions stipulated by the division of labor»21 [that is, in 
obedience to the dominating society]. 
Philosophy, on the other hand, needs to mediate artistic images in order 
to try to go beyond its self-referential logic and to capture the mimetic 
moment, the impulse of feeling an affinity with reality: «Dialectics is a 
thought that does not satisfy itself with the conceptual order, but completes 
art by correcting the conceptual order through the being of objects»22. 
If pain is not only the central aspect of society, but is also the aspect of 
society that allows us to criticize society, then images and thought must work 
together to achieve this outcome. As Susan Sontag suggests, albeit in the 
context of discussing images that are photographs, images owe the ethical 
duty not to give an emotional identification, but «an invitation to pay 
attention, to reflect, to learn, to examine the rationalizations for mass 
suffering offered by established powers»23. 
                                                        
21 T. W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, cit., p. 462. 
22 T. W. Adorno, Einführung in die Dialektik 1958, ed. by C. Ziermann, Suhrkamp, Berlin 
2010, p. 10. My translation from German: «[…] Dialektik ist ein Denken, das sich nicht bei 
der begrifflichen Ordnung bescheidet, sondern die Kunst vollbringt, die begriffliche Ordnung 
durch das Sein der Gegenstände zu korrigieren». 
23 S. Sontag, Regarding the pain of others, cit., p. 117. 
